We study the problem of how to allocate m identical items among n > m agents, assuming each agent desires exactly one item and has a private value for consuming the item. We as...
Geoffroy de Clippel, Victor Naroditskiy, Amy R. Gr...
We analyze the problem of designing a truthful pay-per-click auction where the click-through-rates (CTR) of the bidders are unknown to the auction. Such an auction faces the class...
We study the relationship between the social cost of correlated equilibria and the social cost of Nash equilibria. In contrast to previous work focusing on the possible benefits ...
Milan Bradonjic, Gunes Ercal-Ozkaya, Adam Meyerson...
We study protocols to enable one user (the principal) to make potentially profitable but risky interactions with another user (the agent), in the absence of direct trust between ...
We consider the issue of representing coalitional games in multiagent systems with externalities (i.e., in systems where the performance of one coalition may be affected by other ...
Tomasz P. Michalak, Talal Rahwan, Jacek Sroka, And...