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» Elections Can be Manipulated Often
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AAAI
2007
13 years 9 months ago
Uncertainty in Preference Elicitation and Aggregation
Uncertainty arises in preference aggregation in several ways. There may, for example, be uncertainty in the votes or the voting rule. Such uncertainty can introduce computational ...
Toby Walsh
SAC
2009
ACM
13 years 11 months ago
Taking total control of voting systems: firmware manipulations on an optical scan voting terminal
The firmware of an electronic voting machine is typically treated as a “trusted” component of the system. Consequently, it is misconstrued to be vulnerable only to an insider...
Seda Davtyan, Sotiris Kentros, Aggelos Kiayias, La...
CORR
2006
Springer
154views Education» more  CORR 2006»
13 years 7 months ago
How Hard Is Bribery in Elections?
We study the complexity of influencing elections through bribery: How computationally complex is it for an external actor to determine whether by paying certain voters to change t...
Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hem...
SIGECOM
2010
ACM
128views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2010»
13 years 7 months ago
Equilibria of plurality voting with abstentions
In the traditional voting manipulation literature, it is assumed that a group of manipulators jointly misrepresent their preferences to get a certain candidate elected, while the ...
Yvo Desmedt, Edith Elkind
MFCS
2009
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
Towards a Dichotomy of Finding Possible Winners in Elections Based on Scoring Rules
Abstract. To make a joint decision, agents (or voters) are often required to provide their preferences as linear orders. To determine a winner, the given linear orders can be aggre...
Nadja Betzler, Britta Dorn