Abstract—We study pricing games in single-layer relay networks where the source routes traffic selfishly according to the strategic bids made by relays. Each relay’s bid incl...
We introduce a novel game that models the creation of Internet-like networks by selfish node-agents without central design or coordination. Nodes pay for the links that they esta...
Alex Fabrikant, Ankur Luthra, Elitza N. Maneva, Ch...
We consider the price of selfish routing in terms of tradeoffs and from an average-case perspective. Each player in a network game seeks to send a message with a certain length by...
We study the impact of collusion in network games with splittable flow and focus on the well established price of anarchy as a measure of this impact. We first investigate symmet...
: We revisit price of anarchy in network routing, in a new model in which routing decisions are made by self-interested components of the network, as opposed to by the flows as in ...