Bidding for multiple items or bundles on online auctions raises challenging problems. We assume that an agent has a valuation function that returns its valuation for an arbitrary ...
We derive optimal bidding strategies for a global bidder who participates in multiple, simultaneous second-price auctions with perfect substitutes. We first consider a model where...
Enrico Gerding, Rajdeep K. Dash, David C. K. Yuen,...
In this paper, we derive optimal bidding strategies for a global bidder who participates in multiple, simultaneous second-price auctions with perfect substitutes. We first conside...
Enrico H. Gerding, Rajdeep K. Dash, David C. K. Yu...
This paper describes a study of agent bidding strategies, assuming combinatorial valuations for complementary and substitutable goods, in three auction environments: sequential au...
Online auctions are increasingly being used as a medium to procure goods and services. As the number of auction sites increases, however, consumers will inevitably want to track a...