Combinatorial auctions where agents can bid on bundles of items are desirable because they allow the agents to express complementarity and substitutability between the items. Howe...
This paper describes a study of agent bidding strategies, assuming combinatorial valuations for complementary and substitutable goods, in three auction environments: sequential au...
We describe a generative model for graph edges under specific degree distributions which admits an exact and efficient inference method for recovering the most likely structure. T...
ing and Verifying Strategy-proofness for Auction Mechanisms E. M. Tadjouddine, F. Guerin, and W. Vasconcelos Department of Computing Science, King's College, University of Abe...
Emmanuel M. Tadjouddine, Frank Guerin, Wamberto We...
This paper presents a decentralized task allocation method that can handle allocation of tasks with time and precedence constraints in a multi-agent setting where not all informat...
Mark Hoogendoorn, Maria L. Gini, Catholijn M. Jonk...