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» Exact methods for combinatorial auctions
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CORR
2002
Springer
105views Education» more  CORR 2002»
13 years 7 months ago
Effectiveness of Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions
Combinatorial auctions where agents can bid on bundles of items are desirable because they allow the agents to express complementarity and substitutability between the items. Howe...
Benoît Hudson, Tuomas Sandholm
UAI
2004
13 years 9 months ago
Bidding under Uncertainty: Theory and Experiments
This paper describes a study of agent bidding strategies, assuming combinatorial valuations for complementary and substitutable goods, in three auction environments: sequential au...
Amy R. Greenwald, Justin A. Boyan
ICMLA
2009
13 years 5 months ago
Exact Graph Structure Estimation with Degree Priors
We describe a generative model for graph edges under specific degree distributions which admits an exact and efficient inference method for recovering the most likely structure. T...
Bert Huang, Tony Jebara
DALT
2008
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
Abstracting and Verifying Strategy-Proofness for Auction Mechanisms
ing and Verifying Strategy-proofness for Auction Mechanisms E. M. Tadjouddine, F. Guerin, and W. Vasconcelos Department of Computing Science, King's College, University of Abe...
Emmanuel M. Tadjouddine, Frank Guerin, Wamberto We...
ACMICEC
2007
ACM
127views ECommerce» more  ACMICEC 2007»
13 years 11 months ago
Decentralized task allocation using magnet: an empirical evaluation in the logistics domain
This paper presents a decentralized task allocation method that can handle allocation of tasks with time and precedence constraints in a multi-agent setting where not all informat...
Mark Hoogendoorn, Maria L. Gini, Catholijn M. Jonk...