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» Experimental Market Mechanism Design for Double Auction
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AMEC
2004
Springer
14 years 27 days ago
Specifying and Monitoring Market Mechanisms Using Rights and Obligations
Abstract. We provide a formal scripting language to capture the semantics of market mechanisms. The language is based on a set of welldefined principles, and is designed to captur...
Loizos Michael, David C. Parkes, Avi Pfeffer
WWW
2009
ACM
14 years 8 months ago
General auction mechanism for search advertising
In sponsored search, a number of advertising slots is available on a search results page, and have to be allocated among a set of advertisers competing to display an ad on the pag...
Dávid Pál, Gagan Aggarwal, Martin P&...
EOR
2011
140views more  EOR 2011»
12 years 11 months ago
Compact bidding languages and supplier selection for markets with economies of scale and scope
Combinatorial auctions have been used in procurement markets with economies of scope. Preference elicitation is already a problem in single-unit combinatorial auctions, but it bec...
Martin Bichler, Stefan Schneider, Kemal Guler, Meh...
AMAI
2005
Springer
13 years 7 months ago
Auction design with costly preference elicitation
We consider auction design in a setting with costly preference elicitation. Well designed auctions can help to avoid unnecessary elicitation while determining efficient allocations...
David C. Parkes
ICMAS
1998
13 years 8 months ago
A Market Protocol for Decentralized Task Allocation
We present a decentralized, asynchronous market protocol for allocating and scheduling tasks among agents that contend for scarce resources, constrained by a hierarchical task dep...
William E. Walsh, Michael P. Wellman