3 search results - page 1 / 1 » False-Name-Proof Mechanisms for Hiring a Team |
WINE
2007
Springer
14 years 1 months ago
2007
Springer
We study the problem of hiring a team of selfish agents to perform a task. Each agent is assumed to own one or more elements of a set system, and the auctioneer is trying to purch...
FOCS
2005
IEEE
14 years 1 months ago
2005
IEEE
We study truthful mechanisms for auctions in which the auctioneer is trying to hire a team of agents to perform a complex task, and paying them for their work. As common in the ...
CORR
2006
Springer
13 years 7 months ago
2006
Springer
In set-system auctions, there are several overlapping teams of agents, and a task that can be completed by any of these teams. The auctioneer's goal is to hire a team and pay...