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FOCS
2005
IEEE
14 years 1 months ago
Beyond VCG: Frugality of Truthful Mechanisms
We study truthful mechanisms for auctions in which the auctioneer is trying to hire a team of agents to perform a complex task, and paying them for their work. As common in the ï¬...
Anna R. Karlin, David Kempe, Tami Tamir
ACMICEC
2003
ACM
87views ECommerce» more  ACMICEC 2003»
14 years 26 days ago
A comparison of two algorithms for multi-unit k-double auctions
We develop two algorithms to manage bid data in flexible, multi-unit double auctions. The ï¬rst algorithm is a multi-unit extension of the 4-HEAP algorithm, and the second is a ...
Shengli Bao, Peter R. Wurman
SIGECOM
2005
ACM
92views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2005»
14 years 1 months ago
True costs of cheap labor are hard to measure: edge deletion and VCG payments in graphs
We address the problem of lowering the buyer’s expected payments in shortest path auctions, where the buyer’s goal is to purchase a path in a graph in which edges are owned by...
Edith Elkind
NIPS
2003
13 years 9 months ago
Auction Mechanism Design for Multi-Robot Coordination
The design of cooperative multi-robot systems is a highly active research area in robotics. Two lines of research in particular have generated interest: the solution of large, wea...
Curt A. Bererton, Geoffrey J. Gordon, Sebastian Th...
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
124views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2003»
14 years 25 days ago
Coalitional games on graphs: core structure, substitutes and frugality
We study mechanisms that can be modelled as coalitional games with transferable utilities, and apply ideas from mechanism design and game theory to problems arising in a network d...
Rahul Garg, Vijay Kumar, Atri Rudra, Akshat Verma