Sciweavers

216 search results - page 23 / 44
» Formal Proofs for the Security of Signcryption
Sort
View
ACSAC
2006
IEEE
14 years 1 months ago
Engineering Sufficiently Secure Computing
We propose an architecture of four complimentary technologies increasingly relevant to a growing number of home users and organizations: cryptography, separation kernels, formal v...
Brian Witten
CCS
2001
ACM
14 years 11 hour ago
Events in security protocols
The events of a security protocol and their causal dependency can play an important role in the analysis of security properties. This insight underlies both strand spaces and the ...
Federico Crazzolara, Glynn Winskel
SP
1998
IEEE
116views Security Privacy» more  SP 1998»
13 years 11 months ago
Strand Spaces: Why is a Security Protocol Correct?
A strand is a sequence of events; it represents either the execution of legitimate party in a security protocol or else a sequence of actions by a penetrator. A strand space is a ...
F. Javier Thayer, Jonathan C. Herzog, Joshua D. Gu...
EUROCRYPT
2007
Springer
14 years 1 months ago
The Power of Proofs-of-Possession: Securing Multiparty Signatures against Rogue-Key Attacks
Abstract. Multiparty signature protocols need protection against roguekey attacks, made possible whenever an adversary can choose its public key(s) arbitrarily. For many schemes, p...
Thomas Ristenpart, Scott Yilek
SP
2008
IEEE
162views Security Privacy» more  SP 2008»
13 years 7 months ago
Fable: A Language for Enforcing User-defined Security Policies
This paper presents FABLE, a core formalism for a programming language in which programmers may specify security policies and reason that these policies are properly enforced. In ...
Nikhil Swamy, Brian J. Corcoran, Michael Hicks