Consider an information network with harmful procedures called attackers (e.g., viruses); each attacker uses a probability distribution to choose a node of the network to damage. O...
Marios Mavronicolas, Vicky G. Papadopoulou, Anna P...
We study first-price auction mechanisms for auctioning flow between given nodes in a graph. A first-price auction is any auction in which links on winning paths are paid their ...
Nicole Immorlica, David R. Karger, Evdokia Nikolov...
Consider a network vulnerable to viral infection. The system security software can guarantee safety only to a limited part of the network. Such limitations result from economy cos...
Marios Mavronicolas, Vicky G. Papadopoulou, Anna P...
We give a novel proof of the existence of Nash equilibria in all finite games without using fixed point theorems or path following arguments. Our approach relies on a new notion i...
Noah D. Stein, Pablo A. Parrilo, Asuman E. Ozdagla...
We consider massively dense ad hoc networks and study their continuum limits as the node density increases and as the graph providing the available routes becomes a continuous area...
Alonso Silva, Eitan Altman, Pierre Bernhard, M&eac...