It is frequently suggested that predictions made by game theory could be improved by considering computational restrictions when modeling agents. Under the supposition that player...
Abstract. One reason for wanting to compute an (approximate) Nash equilibrium of a game is to predict how players will play. However, if the game has multiple equilibria that are f...
We present a Coq-formalised proof that all non-cooperative, sequential games have a Nash equilibrium point. Our proof methodology follows the style advocated by LCFstyle theorem p...
We consider the computational complexity of pure Nash equilibria in graphical games. It is known that the problem is NP-complete in general, but tractable (i.e., in P) for special...
We present a computational approach to the saddle-point formulation for the Nash equilibria of two-person, zero-sum sequential games of imperfect information. The algorithm is a ï¬...