This paper explores what kinds of information two parties must communicate in order to correct errors which occur in a shared secret string W. Any bits they communicate must leak ...
A source model for secret key generation between terminals is considered. Two users, namely users 1 and 2, at one side communicate with another user, namely user 3, at the other si...
Somayeh Salimi, Mahmoud Salmasizadeh, Mohammad Rez...
Ramp secret sharing (SS) schemes can be classified into strong ramp SS schemes and weak ramp SS schemes. The strong ramp SS schemes do not leak out any part of a secret explicitly...
Denoting by P = [k]G the elliptic-curve double-and-add multiplication of a public base point G by a secret k, we show that allowing an adversary access to the projective representa...
Tools for analysing secure information flow are almost exclusively based on ideas going back to Denning’s work from the 70’s. This approach embodies an imperfect notion of sec...