The paper analyzes auctions which are not completely enforceable. In such auctions, economic agents may fail to carry out their obligations, and parties involved cannot rely on ex...
This paper analyzes the entrants to the 2007 TAC Market Design competition. It presents a classification of the entries to the competition, and uses this classification to compare...
Jinzhong Niu, Kai Cai, Simon Parsons, Enrico Gerdi...
Bidders on eBay have no dominant bidding strategy when faced with multiple auctions each offering an item of interest. As seen through an analysis of 1,956 auctions on eBay for a...
We study first-price auction mechanisms for auctioning flow between given nodes in a graph. A first-price auction is any auction in which links on winning paths are paid their ...
Nicole Immorlica, David R. Karger, Evdokia Nikolov...
Activity rules have emerged in recent years as an important aspect of practical auction design. The role of an activity rule in an iterative auction is to suppress strategic behav...
Pavithra Harsha, Cynthia Barnhart, David C. Parkes...