This paper analyzes sequential auctions for private value objects using second-price sealed-bid rules. Now, the equilibrium bids for such auctions depend on the information uncerta...
S. Shaheen Fatima, Michael Wooldridge, Nicholas R....
This paper analyzes the entrants to the 2007 TAC Market Design Game. We present a classification of the entries to the competition, and use this classification to compare these ent...
Jinzhong Niu, Kai Cai, Simon Parsons, Peter McBurn...
Online auction sites have very specific workloads and user behavior characteristics. Previous studies on workload characterization conducted by the authors showed that i) bidding a...
Abstract: The current art in optimal combinatorial auctions is limited to handling the case of single units of multiple items, with each bidder bidding on exactly one bundle (singl...
: We study the design of mechanisms in combinatorial auction domains. We focus on settings where the auction is repeated, motivated by auctions for licenses or advertising space. W...