—This paper presents a new economic approach for studying competition and innovation in a complex and highly interactive system of network providers, users, and suppliers of digi...
Zhi-Li Zhang, Papak Nabipay, Andrew M. Odlyzko, Ro...
Peer-to-peer networks often use incentive policies to encourage cooperation between nodes. Such systems are generally susceptible to collusion by groups of users in order to gain ...
Qiao Lian, Zheng Zhang, Mao Yang, Ben Y. Zhao, Yaf...
Abstract. Cooperation, a necessity for any peer-to-peer (P2P) cooperative service, is often achieved by rewarding good behavior now with the promise of future benefits. However, in...
Rational and selfish nodes in P2P systems usually lack effective incentives to cooperate, contributing to the increase of free-riders, and degrading the system performance. Variou...
Abstract. Modeling the competition among telecommunication operators (or providers) as a repeated game may explain why tacit collusion to maintain high charging prices can be obser...