Sciweavers

374 search results - page 6 / 75
» Incentive design for adaptive agents
Sort
View
SIGECOM
2004
ACM
93views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2004»
14 years 27 days ago
Strategic deliberation and truthful revelation: an impossibility result
In many market settings, agents do not know their preferences a priori. Instead, they may have to solve computationally complex optimization problems, query databases, or perform ...
Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm
AAAI
2008
13 years 9 months ago
Partially Synchronized DEC-MDPs in Dynamic Mechanism Design
In this paper, we combine for the first time the methods of dynamic mechanism design with techniques from decentralized decision making under uncertainty. Consider a multi-agent s...
Sven Seuken, Ruggiero Cavallo, David C. Parkes
ATAL
2005
Springer
14 years 1 months ago
Mechanism design and deliberative agents
The central mechanism design problem is to develop incentives for agents to truthfully reveal their preferences over different outcomes, so that the system-wide outcome chosen by ...
Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm
IAT
2008
IEEE
14 years 1 months ago
Multidimensional Adaptations for Open Learning Management Systems
Our work is focused on alleviating the workload for designers of adaptive courses on the complexity task of authoring adaptive learning designs adjusted to specific user character...
Silvia Baldiris, Olga C. Santos, David Huerva, Ram...
AOSE
2004
Springer
14 years 26 days ago
A Design Process for Adaptive Behavior of Situated Agents
Abstract. Engineering non-trivial open multi-agent systems is a challenging task. Our research focusses on situated multi-agent systems, i.e. systems in which agents are explicitly...
Elke Steegmans, Danny Weyns, Tom Holvoet, Yolande ...