In many market settings, agents do not know their preferences a priori. Instead, they may have to solve computationally complex optimization problems, query databases, or perform ...
In this paper, we combine for the first time the methods of dynamic mechanism design with techniques from decentralized decision making under uncertainty. Consider a multi-agent s...
The central mechanism design problem is to develop incentives for agents to truthfully reveal their preferences over different outcomes, so that the system-wide outcome chosen by ...
Our work is focused on alleviating the workload for designers of adaptive courses on the complexity task of authoring adaptive learning designs adjusted to specific user character...
Silvia Baldiris, Olga C. Santos, David Huerva, Ram...
Abstract. Engineering non-trivial open multi-agent systems is a challenging task. Our research focusses on situated multi-agent systems, i.e. systems in which agents are explicitly...
Elke Steegmans, Danny Weyns, Tom Holvoet, Yolande ...