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WINE
2009
Springer
182views Economy» more  WINE 2009»
14 years 4 months ago
Competitive Repeated Allocation without Payments
We study the problem of allocating a single item repeatedly among multiple competing agents, in an environment where monetary transfers are not possible. We design (Bayes-Nash) inc...
Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer, Daniel M. Reeves
FOCS
2008
IEEE
14 years 4 months ago
On the Hardness of Being Truthful
The central problem in computational mechanism design is the tension between incentive compatibility and computational ef ciency. We establish the rst significant approximability ...
Christos H. Papadimitriou, Michael Schapira, Yaron...
WWW
2007
ACM
14 years 10 months ago
Reliable QoS monitoring based on client feedback
Service-level agreements (SLAs) establish a contract between service providers and clients concerning Quality of Service (QoS) parameters. Without proper penalties, service provid...
Radu Jurca, Boi Faltings, Walter Binder
EDBTW
2010
Springer
14 years 4 months ago
Key escrow schemes with sliding window for privacy-aware anomaly detection system
Requirements for a traffic monitoring system can be very demanding as both privacy and performance aspects have to be taken into account jointly. Moreover, the legislation sets fo...
Esa Hyytiä, Ivan Gojmerac, Simone Teofili, Gi...
AAAI
2004
13 years 11 months ago
Methods for Boosting Revenue in Combinatorial Auctions
We study the recognized open problem of designing revenuemaximizing combinatorial auctions. It is unsolved even for two bidders and two items for sale. Rather than pursuing the pu...
Anton Likhodedov, Tuomas Sandholm