In this paper we study the mechanism design problem of coalition formation and cost sharing in an electronic marketplace, where buyers can form coalitions to take advantage of dis...
We consider the problem of designing mechanisms for online problems in which agents arrive over time and the mechanism is unaware of the agent until the agent announces her arriva...
Roberts’ theorem from 1979 states that the only incentive compatible mechanisms over a full domain and range of at least 3 are weighted variants of the VCG mechanism termed affin...
We obtain a characterization of feasible, Bayesian, multi-item multi-bidder mechanisms with independent, additive bidders as distributions over hierarchical mechanisms. Combined w...
Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Wein...
We study a representative task allocation problem called shortest paths: Let G be a graph in which the edges are owned by self interested agents. The cost of each edge is privatel...