We define trust-based mechanism design as an augmentation of traditional mechanism design in which agents take into account the degree of trust that they have in their counterpar...
Rajdeep K. Dash, Sarvapali D. Ramchurn, Nicholas R...
Abstract. This paper reports on the design of an auction mechanism for allocating multiple goods when the buyers have interdependent valuations. We cast the problem as a multi-agen...
Rajdeep K. Dash, Alex Rogers, Nicholas R. Jennings
We characterize truthful mechanisms in two multi-parameter domains. The first characterization shows that every mechanism for combinatorial auctions with two subadditive bidders t...
We introduce the notion of fault tolerant mechanism design, which extends the standard game theoretic framework of mechanism design to allow for uncertainty about execution. Speci...
Ryan Porter, Amir Ronen, Yoav Shoham, Moshe Tennen...
We use game theorectic models to show the lack of incentives in the TCP congestion avoidance algorithm and the consequential systemwide network problems. We then propose a Vickery-...