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WINE
2005
Springer
180views Economy» more  WINE 2005»
14 years 3 months ago
Truth-Telling Reservations
We present a mechanism for reservations of bursty resources that is both truthful and robust. It consists of option contracts whose pricing structure induces users to reveal the tr...
Fang Wu, Li Zhang, Bernardo A. Huberman
GLOBECOM
2009
IEEE
14 years 4 months ago
Revenue Maximization for Communication Networks with Usage-Based Pricing
—We study the optimal usage-based pricing problem in a resource-bounded network with one profit-maximizing service provider and multiple groups of surplus-maximizing users. We ...
Shuqin Li, Jianwei Huang, Shuo-Yen Robert Li
SIGECOM
2011
ACM
180views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2011»
13 years 18 days ago
Individual rationality and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange
As multi-hospital kidney exchange clearinghouses have grown, the set of players has grown from patients and surgeons to include hospitals. Hospitals have the option of enrolling o...
Itai Ashlagi, Alvin Roth
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
143views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2003»
14 years 3 months ago
Differential-revelation VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Combinatorial auctions, where bidders can submit bids on bundles of items, are economically efficient mechanisms for selling items to bidders, and are attractive when the bidders...
Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm
ECAI
2008
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
A Truthful Two-Stage Mechanism for Eliciting Probabilistic Estimates with Unknown Costs
This paper reports on the design of a novel two-stage mechanism, based on strictly proper scoring rules, that motivates selfish rational agents to make a costly probabilistic estim...
Athanasios Papakonstantinou, Alex Rogers, Enrico H...