We discuss the design of multi-dimensional tender and auction mechanisms that combine Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and auction theory. The mechanisms select an agent to perform...
We exhibit incentive compatible multi-unit auctions that are not affine maximizers (i.e. are not of the VCG family) and yet approximate the social welfare to within a factor of 1 ...
We address the problem of maximizing the social welfare in a peer-to-peer streaming overlay given a fixed amount of server upload capacity. We show that peers' selfish behavio...
We introduce the concept of a trust network—a decentralized payment infrastructure in which payments are routed as IOUs between trusted entities. The trust network has directed ...
Arpita Ghosh, Mohammad Mahdian, Daniel M. Reeves, ...
We consider problems of provisioning an excludable public good amongst n potential members of a peer-to-peer system who are able to communicate information about their private pre...