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ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
False-name-proof combinatorial auction protocol: Groves Mechanism with SubModular Approximation
This paper develops a new combinatorial auction protocol called the Groves Mechanism with SubModular Approximation (GM-SMA). This protocol satisfies the following characteristics:...
Makoto Yokoo, Toshihiro Matsutani, Atsushi Iwasaki
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
155views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2008»
13 years 7 months ago
Tight information-theoretic lower bounds for welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions
We provide tight information-theoretic lower bounds for the welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions. In this problem, the goal is to partition m items among k bidde...
Vahab S. Mirrokni, Michael Schapira, Jan Vondr&aac...