In this paper, we study false-name manipulations in weighted voting games. Weighted voting is a well-known model of cooperation among agents in decision-making domains. In such ga...
Weighted voting games provide a popular model of decision making in multiagent systems. Such games are described by a set of players, a list of players' weights, and a quota;...
Michael Zuckerman, Piotr Faliszewski, Yoram Bachra...
An important aspect of mechanism design in social choice protocols and multiagent systems is to discourage insincere and manipulative behaviour. We examine the computational compl...
In sports competitions, teams can manipulate the result by, for instance, throwing games. We show that we can decide how to manipulate round robin and cup competitions, two of the ...
This paper studies to which extent the social welfare of a game can be influenced by an interested third party within economic reason, i.e., by taking the implementation cost into...
Raphael Eidenbenz, Yvonne Anne Oswald, Stefan Schm...