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» Manipulation of copeland elections
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CORR
2006
Springer
154views Education» more  CORR 2006»
13 years 7 months ago
How Hard Is Bribery in Elections?
We study the complexity of influencing elections through bribery: How computationally complex is it for an external actor to determine whether by paying certain voters to change t...
Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hem...
SIGECOM
2010
ACM
128views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2010»
13 years 8 months ago
Equilibria of plurality voting with abstentions
In the traditional voting manipulation literature, it is assumed that a group of manipulators jointly misrepresent their preferences to get a certain candidate elected, while the ...
Yvo Desmedt, Edith Elkind
CORR
2010
Springer
116views Education» more  CORR 2010»
13 years 8 months ago
Where are the hard manipulation problems?
One possible escape from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is computational complexity. For example, it is NP-hard to compute if the STV rule can be manipulated. However, there is...
Toby Walsh
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
138views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2008»
13 years 7 months ago
Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability
We introduce a class of voting rules called generalized scoring rules. Under such a rule, each vote generates a vector of k scores, and the outcome of the voting rule is based onl...
Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer
ATAL
2008
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
Complexity of terminating preference elicitation
Complexity theory is a useful tool to study computational issues surrounding the elicitation of preferences, as well as the strategic manipulation of elections aggregating togethe...
Toby Walsh