Sciweavers

56 search results - page 5 / 12
» Maximizing Revenue in Sequential Auctions
Sort
View
IJCAI
2007
13 years 9 months ago
Spiteful Bidding in Sealed-Bid Auctions
We study the bidding behavior of spiteful agents who, contrary to the common assumption of selfinterest, maximize a convex combination of their own proļ¬t and their competitorsā€...
Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm, Yoav Shoham
WINE
2007
Springer
151views Economy» more  WINE 2007»
14 years 1 months ago
Computing Optimal Bundles for Sponsored Search
A context in sponsored search is additional information about a query, such as the userā€™s age, gender or location, that can change an advertisementā€™s relevance or an advertise...
Arpita Ghosh, Hamid Nazerzadeh, Mukund Sundararaja...
ATAL
2007
Springer
14 years 1 months ago
Outperforming the competition in multi-unit sealed bid auctions
In this paper, we examine the behavior of bidding agents that are in direct competition with the other participants in an auction setting. Thus the agents are not simply trying to...
Ioannis A. Vetsikas, Nicholas R. Jennings
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
83views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2009»
14 years 2 months ago
The price of truthfulness for pay-per-click auctions
We analyze the problem of designing a truthful pay-per-click auction where the click-through-rates (CTR) of the bidders are unknown to the auction. Such an auction faces the class...
Nikhil R. Devanur, Sham M. Kakade
ATAL
2009
Springer
14 years 2 months ago
User modeling in position auctions: re-considering the GSP and VCG mechanisms
We introduce a study of position auctions, with an explicit modeling of user navigation through ads. We refer to our model as the PPA model, since it is most applicable in the con...
Danny Kuminov, Moshe Tennenholtz