We study a multi-unit auction with multiple bidders, each of whom has a private valuation and a budget. The truthful mechanisms of such an auction are characterized, in the sense ...
Christian Borgs, Jennifer T. Chayes, Nicole Immorl...
Auction mechanism design has traditionally been a largely analytic process, relying on assumptions such as fully rational bidders. In practice, however, bidders often exhibit unkn...
David Pardoe, Peter Stone, Maytal Saar-Tsechansky,...
We introduce the concept of a trust network—a decentralized payment infrastructure in which payments are routed as IOUs between trusted entities. The trust network has directed ...
Arpita Ghosh, Mohammad Mahdian, Daniel M. Reeves, ...
In a dynamic market, being able to update one’s value based on information available to other bidders currently in the market can be critical to having profitable transactions. ...
—Online spectrum auctions offer ample flexibility for bidders to request and obtain spectrum on-the-fly. Such flexibility, however, opens up new vulnerabilities to bidder mani...
Lara B. Deek, Xia Zhou, Kevin C. Almeroth, Haitao ...