44 search results - page 5 / 9 » Mechanism Design for Complexity-Constrained Bidders |
JCSS
2008
13 years 11 months ago
2008
We use techniques from sample-complexity in machine learning to reduce problems of incentive-compatible mechanism design to standard algorithmic questions, for a broad class of re...
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 10 months ago
2008
ACM
We characterize truthful mechanisms in two multi-parameter domains. The first characterization shows that every mechanism for combinatorial auctions with two subadditive bidders t...
WECWIS
2003
IEEE
14 years 4 months ago
2003
IEEE
Markets with time dependent goods are special cases of multi commodity markets.The design of large flexible markets with time dependent goods is a computational challenge. In thi...
ATAL
2006
Springer
14 years 2 months ago
2006
Springer
Most research on auctions assumes that potential bidders have private information about their willingness to pay for the item being auctioned, and that they use this information s...
ATAL
2010
Springer
14 years 4 hour ago
2010
Springer
This paper analyzes the worst-case efficiency ratio of falsename-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms. False-nameproofness generalizes strategy-proofness by assuming that a bidd...