44 search results - page 7 / 9 » Mechanism Design for Complexity-Constrained Bidders |
INFOCOM
2011
IEEE
13 years 2 months ago
2011
IEEE
—Dynamic spectrum allocation has proven promising for mitigating the spectrum scarcity problem. In this model, primary users lease chunks of under-utilized spectrum to secondary ...
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
14 years 5 months ago
2009
ACM
The monopolist’s theory of optimal single-item auctions for agents with independent private values can be summarized by two statements. The first is from Myerson [8]: the optim...
WWW
2007
ACM
14 years 11 months ago
2007
ACM
We consider the problem of online keyword advertising auctions among multiple bidders with limited budgets, and study a natural bidding heuristic in which advertisers attempt to o...
CORR
2008
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2008
Springer
A common objective in mechanism design is to choose the outcome (for example, allocation of resources) that maximizes the sum of the agents' valuations, without introducing in...
IJCAI
2001
14 years 7 days ago
2001
Market mechanisms play a central role in AI as a coordination tool in multiagent systems and as an application area for algorithm design. Mechanisms where buyers are directly clea...