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» Mechanism Design for Preference Aggregation over Coalitions
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SIGECOM
2004
ACM
112views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2004»
14 years 1 months ago
Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions
Often, an outcome must be chosen on the basis of the preferences reported by a group of agents. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely to m...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
IPPS
2007
IEEE
14 years 1 months ago
Online Aggregation over Trees
Consider a distributed network with nodes arranged in a tree, and each node having a local value. We consider the problem of aggregating values (e.g., summing values) from all nod...
C. Greg Plaxton, Mitul Tiwari, Praveen Yalagandula
ATAL
2005
Springer
14 years 1 months ago
Mechanism design and deliberative agents
The central mechanism design problem is to develop incentives for agents to truthfully reveal their preferences over different outcomes, so that the system-wide outcome chosen by ...
Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm
AAAI
2010
13 years 9 months ago
Computationally Feasible Automated Mechanism Design: General Approach and Case Studies
In many multiagent settings, a decision must be made based on the preferences of multiple agents, and agents may lie about their preferences if this is to their benefit. In mechan...
Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer
CCR
2008
170views more  CCR 2008»
13 years 7 months ago
Probe-Aided MulTCP: an aggregate congestion control mechanism
An aggregate congestion control mechanism, namely ProbeAided MulTCP (PA-MulTCP), is proposed in this paper. It is based on MulTCP, a proposal for enabling an aggregate to emulate ...
Fang-Chun Kuo, Xiaoming Fu