This paper presents research that led to the design and implementation of an extensible and scalable software framework for the dynamic 3D visualization of simulated construction ...
Abstract. In many settings, bidding agents for auctions do not know their preferences a priori. Instead, they must actively determine them through deliberation (e.g., information p...
Abstract. This paper reports on the design of an auction mechanism for allocating multiple goods when the buyers have interdependent valuations. We cast the problem as a multi-agen...
Rajdeep K. Dash, Alex Rogers, Nicholas R. Jennings
Abstract. We experimentally studied the effects of a eBay-style selfreporting reputation mechanism in an double-sided exchange economy in which participants have the option of not...
Abstract. Virtual Prototyping with haptic feedback offers great benefits in the development process of actuated systems. We present a generic control scheme for the haptic render...