107 search results - page 12 / 22 » Mechanism design for capacity allocation with price competit... |
HPCC
2011
Springer
12 years 8 months ago
2011
Springer
Abstract—In the Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) cloud computing market, spot instances refer to virtual servers that are rented via an auction. Spot instances allow IaaS provi...
ECAI
2008
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2008
Springer
This paper reports on the design of a novel two-stage mechanism, based on strictly proper scoring rules, that motivates selfish rational agents to make a costly probabilistic estim...
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
14 years 2 months ago
2009
ACM
We analyze the problem of designing a truthful pay-per-click auction where the click-through-rates (CTR) of the bidders are unknown to the auction. Such an auction faces the class...
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 8 months ago
2008
ACM
We consider the amount of communication required to verify the outcome of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism: an efficient allocation together with incentivizing VCG paymen...
EUROPAR
2008
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2008
Springer
Abstract. Different auction-based approaches have been used to allocate resources in Grids, but none of them provide the design choice for a specific economic model while consideri...