107 search results - page 3 / 22 » Mechanism design for capacity allocation with price competit... |
ESA
2007
Springer
14 years 2 months ago
2007
Springer
Consider the following network subscription pricing problem. We are given a graph G = (V, E) with a root r, and potential customers are companies headquartered at r with locations...
WINE
2009
Springer
14 years 3 months ago
2009
Springer
We study the problem of allocating a single item repeatedly among multiple competing agents, in an environment where monetary transfers are not possible. We design (Bayes-Nash) inc...
GLOBECOM
2009
IEEE
14 years 3 months ago
2009
IEEE
— This paper studies an auction based allocation of network resources for short-term contracts for heterogeneous network services. The combinatorial winner selection yields the o...
LATIN
2010
Springer
14 years 1 months ago
2010
Springer
We explore the revenue capabilities of truthful, monotone (“fair”) allocation and pricing functions for resource-constrained auction mechanisms within a general framework that ...
HICSS
2007
IEEE
14 years 2 months ago
2007
IEEE
One of the main contributions of classical mechanism design is the derivation of the Groves mechanisms. The class of Groves mechanisms are the only mechanisms that are strategy-pr...