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ATAL
2008
Springer
15 years 6 months ago
Undominated VCG redistribution mechanisms
Many important problems in multiagent systems can be seen as resource allocation problems. For such problems, the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is efficient, in...
Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer
STOC
2010
ACM
194views Algorithms» more  STOC 2010»
15 years 9 months ago
Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
We study the classic mathematical economics problem of Bayesian optimal mechanism design where a principal aims to optimize expected revenue when allocating resources to self-inte...
Shuchi Chawla, Jason Hartline, David Malec and Bal...
WINE
2005
Springer
161views Economy» more  WINE 2005»
15 years 9 months ago
Design of Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Stackelberg Problems
This paper takes the first steps towards designing incentive compatible mechanisms for hierarchical decision making problems involving selfish agents. We call these Stackelberg p...
Dinesh Garg, Yadati Narahari
SIGECOM
2004
ACM
112views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2004»
15 years 9 months ago
Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions
Often, an outcome must be chosen on the basis of the preferences reported by a group of agents. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely to m...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
141views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2003»
15 years 9 months ago
Automated mechanism design for a self-interested designer
Often, an outcome must be chosen on the basis of the preferences reported by a group of agents. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely to m...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm