In this paper, we study the class of competitive equilibria in two sided matching markets with general (non-quasilinear) utility functions. Mechanism design in general non-quasili...
Spectrum is a critical yet scarce resource and it has been shown that dynamic spectrum access can significantly improve spectrum utilization. To achieve this, it is important to ...
We analyze the problem of designing a truthful pay-per-click auction where the click-through-rates (CTR) of the bidders are unknown to the auction. Such an auction faces the class...
For a number of years we have been working towards the goal of automatically creating auction mechanisms, using a range of techniques from evolutionary and multi-agent learning. Th...
Steve Phelps, Kai Cai, Peter McBurney, Jinzhong Ni...
We study the problem of selling identical goods to n unit-demand bidders in a setting in which the total supply of goods is unknown to the mechanism. Items arrive dynamically, and...