We present a method for verifying information flow properties of software programs using inductive assertions and theorem proving. Given a program annotated with information flow a...
Warren A. Hunt Jr., Robert Bellarmine Krug, Sandip...
Abstract: We report on ongoing work towards a posteriori detection of illegal information flows for business processes, focusing on the challenges involved in doing so. Resembling ...
Noninterference requires that there is no information flow from sensitive to public data in a given system. However, many systems perform intentional release of sensitive informat...
Andrew C. Myers, Andrei Sabelfeld, Steve Zdancewic
Noninterference requires that there is no information flow from sensitive to public data in a given system. However, many systems release sensitive information as part of their in...
Andrew C. Myers, Andrei Sabelfeld, Steve Zdancewic
- This paper describes techniques for optimizing range checks performed to detect array bound violations. In addition to the elimination of range check:s, the optimizations discuss...