This paper presents a security analysis of Onion Routing, an application independent infrastructure for tra c-analysis-resistant and anonymous Internet connections. It also includ...
Paul F. Syverson, Gene Tsudik, Michael G. Reed, Ca...
Abstract. Implementations of cryptographic protocols, such as OpenSSL for example, contain bugs affecting security, which cannot be detected by just analyzing abstract protocols (e...
Abstract. We examine the problem of message recognition by reviewing the definitions and the security model in the literature. In particular, we examine the Jane Doe protocol, whi...
Abstract. We propose a general transformation that maps a cryptographic protocol that is secure in an extremely weak sense (essentially in a model where no adversary is present) in...
Low latency anonymous network systems, such as Tor, were considered secure against timing attacks when the threat model does not include a global adversary. In this threat model t...