Understanding the security goals provided by cryptographic protocol implementations is known to be difficult, since security requirements such as secrecy, integrity and authentici...
We consider one-round key exchange protocols secure in the standard model. The security analysis uses the powerful security model of Canetti and Krawczyk and a natural extension of...
Abstract The computational proof model of Bellare and Rogaway for cryptographic protocol analysis is complemented by providing a formal specification of the actions of the adversa...
Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, Colin Boyd, Yvonne Hitchco...
In this paper, we present a new ID-based two-party authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol, which makes use of a new technique called twin Diffie-Hellman problem proposed by Cas...
The primary objective of this paper is to present the deÿnition of a new dynamic, linear and modal logic for security protocols. The logic is compact, expressive and formal. It a...