We present a formal model for modeling and reasoning about security protocols. Our model extends standard, inductive, trace-based, symbolic approaches with a formalization of phys...
Patrick Schaller, Benedikt Schmidt, David A. Basin...
Traditional security protocols are mainly concerned with key establishment and principal authentication and rely on predistributed keys and properties of cryptographic operators. I...
David A. Basin, Srdjan Capkun, Patrick Schaller, B...
In this paper we offer a novel methodology for verifying correctness of (timed) security protocols. The idea consists in computing the time of a correct execution of a session and ...
Logics for security protocol analysis require the formalization of an adversary model that specifies the capabilities of adversaries. A common model is the Dolev-Yao model, which c...
We explore the challenges and research directions in building models, protocols and architectures to support security in pervasive computing environments. We argue that to be succ...