for reasoning about abstract models of protocols. The work on informal methods attempts to discern common patterns in the extensive record of flawed protocols, and to formulate po...
We describe a faithful embedding of the Dolev-Yao model of Backes, Pfitzmann, and Waidner (CCS 2003) in the theorem prover Isabelle/HOL. This model is cryptographically sound in ...
Christoph Sprenger, Michael Backes, David A. Basin...
We present the design and implementation of a compiler that, given high-level multiparty session descriptions, generates custom cryptographic protocols. Our sessions specify pre-a...
We present formal proof rules for inductive reasoning about the way that data transmitted on the network remains secret from a malicious attacker. Extending a compositional protoco...
Arnab Roy, Anupam Datta, Ante Derek, John C. Mitch...
Type-flaw attacks and multi-protocol attacks on security protocols have been frequently reported in the literature. Heather et al. and Guttman et al. proved that these could be pr...