Abstract. We study farsighted coalitional stability in the context of TUgames. Chwe (1994, p.318) notes that, in this context, it is difficult to prove nonemptiness of the largest ...
It is self-evident that in numerous Multiagent settings, selfish agents stand to benefit from cooperating by forming coalitions. Nevertheless, negotiating a stable distribution of...
Agent-based participatory simulations are laboratory experiments designed like agent-based simulations and where humans access the simulation as software agents. This paper descri...
The Shapley Value is arguably the most important normative solution concept in coalitional games. One of its applications is in the domain of networks, where the Shapley Value is u...
Karthik V. Aadithya, Balaraman Ravindran, Tomasz P...
Multi-agent systems are an increasingly important software paradigm and in many of its applications agents cooperate to achieve a particular goal. This requires the design of effi...
Taolue Chen, Marta Z. Kwiatkowska, David Parker, A...