Coalition formation is an important capability for automated negotiation among self-interested agents. In order for coalitions to be stable, a key question that must be answered i...
Naoki Ohta, Vincent Conitzer, Yasufumi Satoh, Atsu...
We present mechanisms, architectures, and an implementation addressing challenges with mobile opportunistic commerce centering on markets and mechanisms that support the procureme...
Many important problems in multiagent systems can be seen as resource allocation problems. For such problems, the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is efficient, in...
We address the learning of trust based on past observations and context information. We argue that from the truster's point of view trust is best expressed as one of several ...
In the strategyproof classification setting, a set of labeled examples is partitioned among multiple agents. Given the reported labels, an optimal classification mechanism returns...
Reshef Meir, Ariel D. Procaccia, Jeffrey S. Rosens...