Restricting the preferences of the agents by assuming that their utility functions linearly depend on a payment allows for the positive results of the Vickrey auction and the Vick...
Paul Harrenstein, Mathijs de Weerdt, Vincent Conit...
In this paper we consider the problem of managing and exploiting schedules in an uncertain and distributed environment. We assume a team of collaborative agents, each responsible ...
Stephen F. Smith, Anthony Gallagher, Terry L. Zimm...
We derive optimal bidding strategies for a global bidding agent that participates in multiple, simultaneous second-price auctions with perfect substitutes. We first consider a mo...
Enrico H. Gerding, Rajdeep K. Dash, David C. K. Yu...
The TAC Supply Chain Management (TAC/SCM) game presents a challenging dynamic environment for autonomous decision-making in a salient application domain. Strategic interactions co...
Patrick R. Jordan, Christopher Kiekintveld, Michae...
This paper analyzes bilateral multi-issue negotiation between selfinterested autonomous agents. The agents have time constraints in the form of both deadlines and discount factors...
S. Shaheen Fatima, Michael Wooldridge, Nicholas R....