Verifying security properties of protocols requires developers to manually create protocol-specific intruder models, which could be tedious and error prone. We present Slede, a ve...
We present three voting protocols with unconditional privacy and information-theoretic correctness, without assuming any bound on the number of corrupt voters or voting authorities...
In the pre-specified peer model for key agreement, it is assumed that a party knows the identifier of its intended communicating peer when it commences a protocol run. On the oth...
We provide the first description of and security model for authenticated key exchange protocols with predicate-based authentication. In addition to the standard goal of session ke...
In this paper we study security definitions for authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols. We observe that there are several families of attacks on AKE protocols that lie outsid...
Brian A. LaMacchia, Kristin Lauter, Anton Mityagin