In this paper we study security definitions for authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols. We observe that there are several families of attacks on AKE protocols that lie outsid...
Brian A. LaMacchia, Kristin Lauter, Anton Mityagin
Abstract. We define a framework to reason about implementations of equational theories in the presence of an adaptive adversary. We particularly focus on soundess of static equiva...
We consider one-round key exchange protocols secure in the standard model. The security analysis uses the powerful security model of Canetti and Krawczyk and a natural extension of...
Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE) [1, 2] allows two parties sharing a password to exchange authenticated information over an insecure network by using a combination of public and secre...
We extend the well-known Tree-Diffie-Hellman technique used for the design of group key exchange (GKE) protocols with robustness, i.e. with resistance to faults resulting from poss...