We propose a modification to the framework of Universally Composable (UC) security [3]. Our new notion, involves comparing the protocol executions with an ideal execution involvin...
d Abstract) Ran Canetti Yehuda Lindell Rafail Ostrovsky Amit Sahai? We show how to securely realize any multi-party functionality in a universally composable way, regardless of th...
Ran Canetti, Yehuda Lindell, Rafail Ostrovsky, Ami...
We review threat models used in the evaluation of anonymity systems’ vulnerability to traffic analysis. We then suggest that, under the partial adversary model, if multiple packe...
Abstract. While there is a great deal of sophistication in modern cryptology, simple (and simplistic) explanations of cryptography remain useful and perhaps necessary. Many of the ...
Abstract. We present a general method to prove security properties of cryptographic protocols against active adversaries, when the messages exchanged by the honest parties are arbi...