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» On Low-Envy Truthful Allocations
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ESA
2008
Springer
195views Algorithms» more  ESA 2008»
13 years 8 months ago
A Characterization of 2-Player Mechanisms for Scheduling
We study the mechanism design problem of scheduling unrelated machines and we completely characterize the decisive truthful mechanisms for two players when the domain contains bot...
George Christodoulou, Elias Koutsoupias, Angelina ...
CORR
2010
Springer
96views Education» more  CORR 2010»
13 years 6 months ago
Truth and Envy in Capacitated Allocation Games
Edith Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Haim Kapla...
SIGECOM
2010
ACM
161views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2010»
13 years 11 months ago
Computation and incentives in combinatorial public projects
The Combinatorial Public Projects Problem s an abstraction of resource allocation problems in which agents have preferences over alternatives, and an outcome that is to be collect...
Dave Buchfuhrer, Michael Schapira, Yaron Singer
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
152views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2008»
13 years 6 months ago
On characterizations of truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions and scheduling
We characterize truthful mechanisms in two multi-parameter domains. The first characterization shows that every mechanism for combinatorial auctions with two subadditive bidders t...
Shahar Dobzinski, Mukund Sundararajan
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
106views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2003»
13 years 12 months ago
Envy-free auctions for digital goods
We study auctions for a commodity in unlimited supply, e.g., a digital good. In particular we consider three desirable properties for auctions: • Competitive: the auction achiev...
Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline