Full revelation of private values is impractical in many large-scale markets, where posted price mechanisms are a simpler alternative. In this work, we compare the asymptotic beha...
This paper describes a study of agent bidding strategies, assuming combinatorial valuations for complementary and substitutable goods, in three auction environments: sequential au...
We give a simple analysis of the competitive ratio of the random sampling auction from [10]. The random sampling auction was first shown to be worst-case competitive in [9] (with ...
Uriel Feige, Abraham Flaxman, Jason D. Hartline, R...
Abstract. This paper investigates utility maximising bidding heuristics for agents that participate in multiple heterogeneous auctions, in which the auction format and the starting...
David C. K. Yuen, Andrew Byde, Nicholas R. Jenning...
: We consider two mechanisms to procure differentiated goods: the request for quote and an English auction with bidding credits. In the request for quote, each seller submits a pri...