In this paper we extend the notion of multi-unit combinatorial reverse auction by adding a new dimension to the goods at auction. In such a new type of combinatorial auction a buye...
We study a class of single-round, sealed-bid auctions for a set of identical items. We adopt the worst case competitive framework defined by [1,2] that compares the profit of an ...
Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline, Anna R. Kar...
Using a model of agent behavior based around envy-reducing strategies, we describe an iterated combinatorial auction in which the allocation and prices converge to a solution in t...
In this paper, we derive optimal bidding strategies for a global bidder who participates in multiple, simultaneous second-price auctions with perfect substitutes. We first conside...
Enrico H. Gerding, Rajdeep K. Dash, David C. K. Yu...
We study the design and approximation of optimal crowdsourcing contests. Crowdsourcing contests can be modeled as all-pay auctions because entrants must exert effort up-front to e...
Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, Balasubramanian ...