243 search results - page 34 / 49 » On Optimal Single-Item Auctions |
GECCO
2005
Springer
14 years 27 days ago
2005
Springer
Many non-cooperative settings that could potentially be studied using game theory are characterized by having very large strategy spaces and payoffs that are costly to compute. Be...
CANS
2009
Springer
14 years 1 months ago
2009
Springer
Abstract. We consider generic Garbled Circuit (GC)-based techniques for Secure Function Evaluation (SFE) in the semi-honest model. We describe efficient GC constructions for additi...
ATAL
2010
Springer
13 years 8 months ago
2010
Springer
We consider collusion in multi-unit auctions where the allocation and payments are determined using the VCG mechanism. We show how collusion can increase the utility of the collud...
WINE
2010
Springer
13 years 5 months ago
2010
Springer
We consider collusion in path procurement auctions, where payments are determined using the VCG mechanism. We show that collusion can increase the utility of the agents, and in som...
ATAL
2010
Springer
13 years 8 months ago
2010
Springer
This paper analyzes the worst-case efficiency ratio of falsename-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms. False-nameproofness generalizes strategy-proofness by assuming that a bidd...