We characterize truthful mechanisms in two multi-parameter domains. The first characterization shows that every mechanism for combinatorial auctions with two subadditive bidders t...
We present a simple auction protocol for the sale of overdemanded goods with a delivery schedule. Under some reasonable assumptions, our mechanism is incentive compatible, collect...
Our attention is focused on designing an optimal procurement mechanism which a buyer can use for procuring multiple units of a homogeneous item based on bids submitted by autonomou...
N. Hemachandra, Raghav Kumar Gautam, V. Hastagiri ...
Abstract. In a multicore transactional memory (TM) system, concurrent execution threads interact and interfere with each other through shared memory. The less interference a progra...
We obtain a characterization of feasible, Bayesian, multi-item multi-bidder mechanisms with independent, additive bidders as distributions over hierarchical mechanisms. Combined w...
Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Wein...