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» On decentralized incentive compatible mechanisms
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SIGECOM
2008
ACM
152views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2008»
13 years 7 months ago
On characterizations of truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions and scheduling
We characterize truthful mechanisms in two multi-parameter domains. The first characterization shows that every mechanism for combinatorial auctions with two subadditive bidders t...
Shahar Dobzinski, Mukund Sundararajan
WECWIS
2005
IEEE
103views ECommerce» more  WECWIS 2005»
14 years 1 months ago
An Auction for Scheduling Delivery of Highly Demanded Products
We present a simple auction protocol for the sale of overdemanded goods with a delivery schedule. Under some reasonable assumptions, our mechanism is incentive compatible, collect...
Sameer Korrapati, Peter R. Wurman

Publication
270views
15 years 6 months ago
Optimal Auctions for Multi-Unit Procurement with Volume Discount Bids
Our attention is focused on designing an optimal procurement mechanism which a buyer can use for procuring multiple units of a homogeneous item based on bids submitted by autonomou...
N. Hemachandra, Raghav Kumar Gautam, V. Hastagiri ...
ISAAC
2009
Springer
114views Algorithms» more  ISAAC 2009»
14 years 2 months ago
Good Programming in Transactional Memory
Abstract. In a multicore transactional memory (TM) system, concurrent execution threads interact and interfere with each other through shared memory. The less interference a progra...
Raphael Eidenbenz, Roger Wattenhofer
STOC
2012
ACM
225views Algorithms» more  STOC 2012»
11 years 10 months ago
An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms
We obtain a characterization of feasible, Bayesian, multi-item multi-bidder mechanisms with independent, additive bidders as distributions over hierarchical mechanisms. Combined w...
Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Wein...